LETTER: Patents are harmful to the public good
September 12, 2004
In the Sept. 10 letter by Noah Stahl, he criticizes Professor Smith. He doubtlessly saw Smith’s letter as a series of statements so self-evidently false as to barely merit argument. Indeed, Stahl’s letter demonstrates this opinion by being short on argument and long on bare assertion.
Stahl goes on and on about Professor Smith’s “faulty premises.” So, in the interest of fairness, let us now examine some of Stahl’s premises. Stahl asserts that it is necessary for individuals to have exclusive rights to their innovations, as without such exclusivity they will stop producing, driving down innovation on a societal level, thus hampering the public good. Hmmm.
It seems Stahl’s argument relies on the supremacy of the public good for its power. He uses exclusivity of intellectual property as a way to achieve the public good, not a denial of it. If it can be shown that Stahl’s model actually fails to promote the public good, his argument falls apart.
There is also an implicit assertion that the interests of individuals (or particular businesses) will not conflict with the interests of society as a whole or with the interests of every other individual in society. As we have established that the argument does rely on the public good, we can see why this assertion is necessary.
A cursory examination of the history of business can show us that such lack of interest conflict has not empirically been the case. It is equally absurd from a theory standpoint, even utilizing rational choice theory, which Stahl seems to buy into.
In order for Stahl’s model to work, we must assume that in each individual and firm trying to get ahead of its competitors, it is not possible for anyone to remain far enough ahead to keep any advantage in technology or power. The patent system, in maintaining exclusivity, allows the sustainability of such advantages. It is in the rational self interest of individuals and firms to make the most of such advantages to destroy competition, not promote it.
Such a system creates a scenario in which the most powerful stay the most powerful. Some may argue that such “winners” may have earned those advantages, and those who are unable to compete are out of luck.
Unfortunately, we will never know how new potential competitors would have fared, as the patent system allows the continuation of pre-existing advantages, hedging out competition and innovation.
In other words, the only way Stahl’s model works is if there is a level playing field, not just legally, but substantively, across nearly every possible variable, and that such equality remains a constant feature of the system. This has never been the case.
Perhaps it would be beneficial to us to re-examine our own ideas, and to consider Smith’s ideas rather than dismissing them out of hand.
Michael Falkstrom
Graduate Student
Political Science