On the other side of the world in a small, concrete cell, surrounded by iron bars and armed guards, sits a man who once struck fear in the hearts of millions. He does not look quite as tough as he used to be, when he would fire a rifle into the air as he stood on a balcony in front of a cheering crowd of thousands. Now he paces the length and breadth of a container he may have placed political prisoners in at one time; poetic justice some might say, but the irony is startling.

In spite of the American propaganda machine, which portrays Saddam Hussein as a monster, when stripped of his uniforms, icons, soldiers and wealth, we realize that he is just a man, not unlike many other middle-aged men. He has a sagging belly, receding hairline and, probably, especially now, his fair share of constipation.

It is also difficult to imagine that 15 years ago he was an important U.S. partner in the Middle East.

This August marks the 15th anniversary of the day things changed for Saddam, the day he cast his lot and soured his relationship with the United States by invading Kuwait. Up until this time, Hussein had been a strategic partner of the United States, keeping Iran in check and keeping Iraqi crude flowing to feed our thirst for oil.

The relationship began as early as 1982, when an Iranian offensive was pushing back the initial victories won by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War.

In order to help Iraq beat back the Iranians, it was conveniently removed from the U.S. State Department’s list of nations that support terrorism and provided with guaranteed loans for U.S. commodities.

In 1983 it was clear to the United States that Iraq was in violation of Geneva protocols as it used chemical weapons against the Iranians, as well as Kurdish insurgents, “almost daily” according to one U.S. State Department memo.

The response of the United States was to send present Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as a presidential envoy, to meet with Hussein on no less than two occasions.

One declassified State Department video (Google “Saddam Hussein Sourcebook”) shows Rumsfeld shaking hands with the Iraqi dictator.

Iraq’s proclivities to use chemical weapons were never discussed, but strategies to keep Iraqi oil flowing were.

This strategic (I say “strategic,” because it was never close, but always necessary) relationship continued through Saddam’s domestic purges and gassing of civilians.

As long as Iraqi oil flowed and the influx of Middle Eastern crude remained steady, we turned a blind eye to Hussein’s misdeeds. It was only when Iraq invaded Kuwait that the former ally became a bitter enemy.

Hundreds of billions of dollars, thousands of American lives, and 15 years later we are still trying to make right our former relationship with Saddam Hussein.

As much as we might like to pretend otherwise, the United States is not in the freedom business; it is in the security business. Like any nation, we seek to stack the chips in our favor when we can and, when it serves our interests, we tend to make deals with devils more frequently than we would like to admit.

It is neither right nor wrong that we befriended Saddam only to betray him — in his eyes at least. We did what any other country would have done in our place. We preferred Hussein in charge of Iraq’s oil instead of Iran. Principles mean little in politics.

When Saddam Hussein is tried, and potentially put to death, it will be impossible for us to fully absolve ourselves of our own guilt in the matter, having been the nation that supported him as long as he played by our rules.

Nevertheless, when the time comes, we should keep in mind who supported his regime for nearly a decade and, for what it is worth, have at least some sympathy for the devil.

— Jeremy Oehlert is a junior in psychology from Osceola.