In its last session, the Supreme Court addressed a case in which a fellow by the name of Ralph Blakely kidnapped his estranged wife. A jury found him guilty, which should have led to a maximum sentence of 53 months under the sentencing guidelines of Washington State.

The judge imposed a sentence of 90 months, under laws that allowed for exceptional sentences in the case of “deliberate cruelty.” The only problem? The jury never heard this argument.

The Court ruled that since the jury had not been able to weigh this charge and apply the reasonable doubt standard, Blakely’s sentence was a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. This decision specifically meant the Washington State sentencing guidelines, but it could easily be applied to the federal standards as well.

So easily, in fact, that two circuit Courts of Appeals have ruled that it does contradict them.

In her dissent, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor argued that the effects of the decision might be disastrous. Because sentencing guidelines would now require the state to prove every detail upon which a judge might base a sentence, and because without these guidelines a judge could use his or her own discretion in considering facts not proved to a jury, states might move away from the guidelines for strictly practical reasons. The more things you have to prove in a case, the more it costs to prosecute it.

Now the Court is dealing with the fallout of the Blakely decision. With some circuits abolishing the federal guidelines, some upholding them and others cobbling together makeshift compliance rules for cases already underway, there is a lot of fallout with which to deal.

Their first two cases of this new session were extensions of the Blakely ruling, and the decisions are likely to determine the future of the federal sentencing guidelines. From arguments heard earlier this week, it doesn’t sound like anyone on the Court has had a change of heart.

And they shouldn’t. No judge should be able to double the length of a sentence based on facts that aren’t presented to a jury.

To argue anything else would defeat the purpose of sentencing guidelines. Although Justice O’Connor is right that there might be downsides to the decision, those depend more on a state’s willingness to stand up for a sound judicial process. And though there is ample evidence that some states are not willing to stand up for this (narcoleptic public defenders in Texas, anyone?), it is a matter for those states to consider on their own.

If these potential problems do become severe, the Supreme Court will still be around to deal with them.