On Sunday, President Bush addressed the nation to speak about the war in Iraq and the war on terror. Supporters of increased U.S. military presence in the Middle East since 9/11 applaud Bush for standing up to the terrorists that threaten America. Critics, for the most part, think that the Iraq war is unnecessary, imperialistic, and costly in American dollars and lives.

In 20/20 hindsight, it’s easy to question the anxiety over weapons of mass destruction that fueled the drive to war, especially in light of the fact that no such weapons have yet been found. As the search continues for Saddam’s chemical and biological weapons, war supporters grow increasingly befuddled.

The question for them is not whether Saddam ever really had the weapons; the question is what on earth did he do with them that is making so hard to find? As tedious as the 12-year chronicle of UN Security Council Resolutions (SCRs) on Iraq may be, it is irresponsible and ignorant not to take this history into account when debating Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In 1991 it was common knowledge to the international community that Saddam Hussein’s threatened use of chemical and biological weapons posed a grave danger to the entire world. SCR 687, passed in April of that year, demanded that “Iraq unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all chemical and biological weapons.” No one doubted that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.

In August 1991, SCR 707 declared Iraq in material breach of 687, citing multiple letters and reports from weapons inspectors. In an extensive nine-point list, 707 also reiterated Iraq’s “obligations” under SCR 687 and demanded full compliance with all weapons inspections.

For all its bravado, however, 707 made no reference to what repercussions might befall Iraq should it continue to violate 687. In fact, the resolution is glaringly devoid of any semblance of backbone. Its dizzying abundance of relative clauses and run-on sentences cannot conceal how embarrassingly unenforceable it is.

The list goes on. Resolutions 1060 and 1115 in 1996 and 1997, respectively, castigate Iraq for denying access to certain sites designated for weapons inspection. November 1997 resolution 1137, however, shows Iraq who’s boss by imposing travel bans on Iraqi officials until they resume cooperation with inspectors.

In 1998 Iraq announced that it was suspending cooperation with UN weapons inspection agencies. The Security Council responded with Resolution 1194, which expressed its readiness to consider “a comprehensive review [of] Iraq’s compliance” if Iraq resumed cooperation. This is comparable to punishing a disobedient child by giving him a cookie if he promises not to be bad anymore.

Then came Resolution 1441 last November, which, among other things, reiterated just how much the Security Council “deplored” Iraq’s refusal to cooperate with weapons inspectors. It also mentioned that the cease-fire promised by SCR 687 was incumbent upon Iraq’s “acceptance of the provisions of that resolution.” Almost comically, the resolution also notes that the Council was “determined to secure full compliance with its decisions.” That must have been some determination, mustered for eleven years and counting.

Resolution 1441 again held Iraq in material breach of 687. But by that time, Saddam had learned that the United Nations employed neither sticks nor stones, and that its words could certainly never hurt him. The resolution also afforded Iraq “a final opportunity” to comply with “disarmament obligations,” to which end it proposed an “enhanced inspection regime” that would bring the process of disbanding all prohibited weapons projects in Iraq “to full and verified completion.”

It is not until the second to last paragraph that the Security Council meekly calls to mind its repeated warnings that Iraq will face “serious consequences” in the event of continued violations.

In light of this history it is not difficult to empathize with a world power that simply got tired of waiting for an indolent, impotent international body.

Two years ago tomorrow, America learned that it could be attacked on its own soil by terrorists who passionately desire to destroy it. For now, links between Iraq and al-Qaida remain a mixture of classified intelligence and academic conjecture.

But we can take some comfort in the fact that the world now contains one less regime renowned for its horrific atrocities, its habitual disregard for international authority and its hatred of America.