Do you cherish your privacy?
September 9, 1997
I’d bet most of us don’t think much about privacy. I know I don’t. In the information age, privacy seems increasingly to be something one can learn to live without.
Until, that is, someone uses private information against you.
Most people don’t seem to realize how insecure their electronic communications are.
This has become an extreme issue with the advent of the Internet; anyone with the desire, some small knowledge and access can undetectably and on a large-scale intercept with all communications going past that point.
These communications can be recorded and/or rapidly scanned for keywords or concepts such as a company or individual’s name. Or a political viewpoint.
The concept is kind of scary, when you consider the possibilities. It is as though someone could simultaneously (and effortlessly) steam open all letters sent in the U.S., scan their contents, and send them on their way without leaving a trace. This is the sort of tool people with ill intentions (from stalkers to totalitarian governments) dream about.
Interestingly, it is this capability that some folks in the U.S. government would like to keep their hands on through rule of law (although they promise they wouldn’t use it that way).
You see, in response to the openness and lack of privacy in computer communications, powerful encryption programs and algorithms have been developed that render communications unreadable by anyone save the intended recipient.
These algorithms (and computer source code implementations) are publicly known; they are not secret. Impenetrable codes can therefore be used by anyone to keep private communications private, regardless of the level of motivation, expertise or money an eavesdropper would bring to bear.
This evidently worries the FBI, whose director, Louis Freeh, recently testified before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information that a “mandatory” system which enables government officials to read private communications is necessary for law enforcement to do its job.
In further testimony, Freeh implied that mandatory “key-recovery” (a back-door method to read encrypted communications) would keep the status quo, and that law enforcement would be all but impossible without it.
I believe both assertions are patently false, and this is why I am very concerned about the consequences should key-recovery proponents have their way.
The system they are proposing deeply undermines the security that powerful encryption offers.
This security is necessary (and will be more so in the future) for purposes range from the requirement that all homeowners have front doors no stronger than would allow law enforcement to easily break or send copies of their house keys to the FBI.
Not only would legislation weakening cryptographic products be a prior restraint and a presumption of guilt (you are restraining all citizens from using technology that protects privacy in the name of POSSIBLE future criminal investigation), it would also be impossible to implement with a level of security consistent with the political power involved, leaving American communications open to possible interception and misuse.
It would not stop criminals from using easily-made encryption products lacking weaknesses.
The legislation would permanently entrench massive, easy and undetectable communication eavesdropping capability and intensify anti-government sentiment and fears among some parts of the population, who already believe government is out of control.
It would put American software companies at a significant competitive disadvantage against foreign companies not required to weaken their encryption products.
If you care about privacy, or even if you’re looking for a good cause, I have one for you.
This is an important 4th Amendment issue.
Mandatory key-recovery is not a compromise between law enforcement and civil liberties, as testimony from the FBI, NSA, Clinton Administration and others are claiming.
It is overbalancing power in government’s favor and a foolish idea from a security standpoint.
Law enforcement has many other tools available for fighting crime without this Orwellian capability.
Congressional debate is proceeding as I write this, with votes likely within the next two weeks.
Your members of Congress could use your input.
Jonathan Williams
Senior
Electrical engineering