I am writing in response to the editorial published in the Thursday, June 27 issue of the Iowa State Daily.

The signing of the CTBT treaty is indeed very important and I believe the United States needs to do all it possibly can to secure a nuclear-safe world.

There is an additional treaty that we need to focus on more, however.

The NPT deals with a problem so much more insidious than the mere observation of the progress of nuclear development, which of course, we realize the CTBT is and that it is an after-the-fact control, and that the problem is so related to a country’s sovereignty, is so integrated into the global economy, the skill and expertise to develop a treaty in that kind of environment required the most thoughtful of approaches.

The art to develop a plan to suppress a nation’s hunger for a ‘tool of power’ that could be used in a war of death, or much more likely, a war of ‘impress,’ must measure what the most likely response of our fellow states will be when it comes to measuring our strength to the next state and not just our ability to demonstrate that power.

The trade in nuclear materials and delivery equipment is increasing.

We have five nations identified as positive nuclear capable. We have four nations with a positive nuclear capable rating, but with a relatively low inventory of bombs.

The interesting argument concerning the low inventory countries reduces to the idea that with a low balance that nation might actually be more vulnerable because an opponent could hit all of the existing weapons of the other and then would have control.

A few nuclear weapons will never provide the security shield that a nation advisedly requires.

Additionally, the U.S. places the source of greatest instability in the emerging nations with the capabilities to deliver nuclear or conventional warheads.

The state department decided to negotiate a treaty with an unlimited duration.

By arguing for an unlimited duration I contend the state department has assured the world of an immediate and extensive spread of the nuclear fuels, technology and ultimate fear and threat.

If we consider why the nations with low inventories and nations without the actual weaponry have such a ‘hunger’ for those ‘death threats,’ you must accept the idea that a denial of that ‘tool of strength’ forever will simply remove any inhibition to do whatever is necessary today to fulfill what they perceive is their need.

There is nothing in the life time contract that can be argued that will suppress the desire for power.

The only reasonable approach to the duration question is from an angle that argues that if the term had been short, let’s say five or ten years, would a ‘nation in need’ be willing to risk being ostracized by the world, knowing the focus would be sharp during that short known period.

My thought is that the ‘need nations’ would advisedly set back, given the changing world conditions, betting that a favorable environment which would allow access to nuclear materials would occur during that five or ten year period or immediately thereafter.

What we are agreeing to seems so right, but because man still makes his nationalistic decisions the same as he did many years ago, we can expect him to be predictable and to desire and pursue the access of nuclear power.

Paul Copenhaver

Senior

Political Science