With a tenuous cease-fire holding in Bosnia, it looks as though the United States is going to commit a large ground force as its part of the NATO commitment to keep the agreement in force.

It is the right thing to do in the situation; we were primarily responsible for brokering the peace agreement now in place, and we played a large role in the bombing campaign that brought the Serbs to the bargaining table with more seriousness.

Bob Dole has promised to begin debate in the Senate on sending the planned 25,000-troop force to Bosnia, a debate sure to bring out the right-wing’s isolationists who don’t want U.S. troops anywhere on the globe where U.S. interests are not directly threatened.

That short-sighted view will only lead to problems for the U.S. in the future because any significant conflict, and the Yugoslavian War certainly qualifies as one, will eventually have an effect on U.S. policy somewhere.

The Senate also needs to consider the fact that this will not be an exclusively U.S. operation, nor a U.N. operation.

NATO will be in control on the ground, and the plan calls for a division of responsibility between the U.S., Britain and France with Bosnia divided into zones similar to how Germany was divided following World War Two.

The U.S. is a major part of NATO; most would say that the U.S. is the de facto leader of the alliance. We have closer economic, strategic, and cultural ties with the NATO states than with any nation or group of nations. Therefore, we have a responsibility to participate in any large NATO action such as in Bosnia.

What the Senate must realize is that this operation will be a treaty enforcement action, not a U.N. peacekeeping mission. The U.N. Protection Force, or UNPROFOR, will probably rank in history as one of the most impotent forces ever put into a combat zone, mainly due to the ultra-restrictive rules of engagement assigned to it by the diplomats at the U.N.

UNPROFOR units frequently came under heavy fire from the various warring parties, or witnessed severe fighting nearby and were able to take no action because the rules were so restrictive.

It’s a good thing that the U.N. won’t be the primary organization running this operation. Since the Korean War the U.N. has demonstrated a near-total incompetence in the running of military operations because the diplomatic objectives of the U.N. always take precedence, and diplomatic nicety does not work at all in combat.

Three years ago I attended the Model United Nations of the Far West in San Francisco, and if the level of stupidity shown by the delegates there regarding military operations is present in the real U.N. then the U.S. would be well advised to steer clear of U.N.-commanded operations in the future.

A resolution nearly passed in which U.N. peacekeeping forces would use “passive negotiation techniques” in a conflict.

The idea was that they would literally stand between the combatants and, I suppose, try and calm everyone down while not firing back in defense. Imagine the reaction of, say, the 82nd Airborne to those orders. Their next operation should be a parachute drop outside the U.N. Building, along with a severe visit with the Security Council concerning proper use of forces.

The occupation of Bosnia will require some heavyweight units. The Serbs and Croats, the two groups most likely to engage our people, have a fair amount of firepower that they could bring to bear and as such they must be effectively countered. The current operations plan calls for a rapid reaction force capable of moving quickly and hitting hard on short notice. Owing to the rough terrain in the region, a force capable of moving by air is a necessary.

The 101st Airborne (Air Assault) is the best fit for this part of the mission. While all infantry units practice movement by air, the 101st is what used to be called an “air mobile” division and is optimized for movement by helicopter.

Another necessity is the presence of Special Forces on the ground. Contact with the population in order to gather intelligence and gain trust is key, and the Army’s Special Forces, popularly called the Green Berets are perfect for the job.

They receive intensive language and cultural training, and would also be used to protect certain key positions such as road checkpoints.

Although Bosnia is not a good country for heavy armor, the Serbs do have some tanks available. The best way to deal with that threat is to counter it with our own armor, including tanks and lighter vehicles such as the M-2 Bradley.

Our forces in Somalia had no such armor due to political considerations, and they paid for it dearly when the fighting there got intense. We should not allow such a thing to happen again.

Finally, the rules of engagement for NATO’s troops must be flexible enough to allow commanders on the ground to protect their forces, or to launch proactive operations if they feel that one side is threatening them or violating the treaty.

If we are going to send our people to Bosnia, the operation needs to be planned and run as a military operation.

That means that NATO troops need to have the firepower and ability within the rules to engage and defeat forces threatening them or violating the treaty. If not, then the treaty will fail, and the whole operation will be a worthless exercise.

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Kevin S. Kirby is a senior in journalism mass communication from Louisville, Ky. He has a B.A. in political science from the University of Wyoming.