On Aug. 12 of this year, New York District Judge Shira A. Scheindlin ruled on the case Floyd v. City of New York; the issue was a policy known as “stop and frisk,” a New York Police Department’s policy that made it acceptable to stop and frisk a person if they felt there was “reasonable suspicion.”

From January 2004 to June 2012, the NYPD made 4.4 million stops. Of these stops, 52 percent were followed by a protective frisk for a weapon, which was found in 1 percent of frisks. Of the people stopped, 52 percent were black and 31 percent were Hispanic. At the time, New York City’s population was 23 percent black, 29 percent Hispanic and 33 percent white.

The legality of “stop and frisk” already had been determined in a historic Supreme Court case named Terry v. Ohio in 1968. The issue was whether or not an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be secure in “their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures” was violated.

In Terry v. Ohio, a “stop” was considered similar to a “search” and a “frisk” was considered similar to a “seizure,” but a “stop and frisk” needed a “reasonable suspicion” where as a “search and seizure” needed a “probable cause.” The reasoning was that police have a duty to stop a crime if possible, and for their own protection, they have a right to make sure no weapons are a possible threat.

The issue in Floyd v. City of New York was whether the police had a “reasonable suspicion” and whether that “reasonable suspicion” was determined by race. This is a reasonable question, considering the percentage of non-white people who have been subject to “stop and frisk” is very disproportionate to the racial makeup of the city.

By the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment individuals are protected against intentional discrimination based on race. So, if a police officer determined a person “reasonably suspicious” mainly based on his or her race, that would be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

The statistics are not sufficient to prove the officers were taking race into consideration when determining “reasonable suspicion,” since they could be considered just circumstantial.

The NYPD argues there has been a dramatic decrease in crime since 2004, when this policy was put in place. But Scheindlin made the point: “I emphasize at the outset, as I have throughout the litigation, that this case is not about the effectiveness of stop and frisk in deterring or combating crime. This Court’s mandate is solely to judge the constitutionality of police behavior, not its effectiveness as a law enforcement tool.”

The court then mandated that, in an effort to fix this problem, the NYPD is required to wear cameras on their person.

So what does this mean for modern day civil rights? It’s a step in the right direction, but it doesn’t solve the problem. There is no way for the court or the United States to regulate racial stereotypes in an individual’s mind. And unfortunately, there is no way to prove the officers were acting on racist notions. But maybe this prominent of a court case will make the NYPD and other police departments reflect upon the way they are handling the public, and question themselves.