Our policy objectives in Kosovo are to stop the Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing and to allow the Kosovars to return to the native lands from which they have been driven. Whether we are foolish enough to believe the Kosovars will want to return to their homes and live alongside the Serbs is beside the point, though a question worth asking.

However, our chosen method of accomplishing this task is the strategic bombardment of crucial Serbian capabilities. These air strikes include all manner of targets, from military supply depots to gas refineries and communications centers.

The air war we are embracing offers the lowest risk to American personnel, which is crucial to maintaining American support at home for any policy of intervention.

Yet, history has shown that a policy of strategic bombing conducted against an enemy has never worked.

To believe that it shall miraculously start working in Kosovo is foolish.

The first attempts at strategic bombing took place in World War II, when optimistic Allied planners believed they could force Germany to surrender without an actual land invasion.

For all the bombs we dropped on crucial German factories and installations, their capacity to wage war was not appreciably reduced.

In fact, Germany did not reach peak production of war materials until 1944 despite Allied air raids involving more than two thousand bombers (Millett & Maslowski, 459).

The only times that bombing has actually worked to defeat an enemy have been when we engage in city-busting, a policy whose goal is the widespread destruction of entire areas.

Military installations become secondary targets and civilian casualties become the primary goal.

The best historical example is Tokyo, in which our military used incendiary bombs to set the town ablaze and kill more than 100,000 people.

That Hiroshima and Nagasaki were key factors in bringing about Japan’s surrender illustrates the fact that bombing can only work when we target important civilian centers and annihilate the populace.

In light of this, it would appear that, for a policy of bombing to work in Kosovo, we would have to engage in destruction of a far wider scope.

Even if we were to wipe Belgrade off the map with a fleet of B-52s, the Serbian military is so dispersed that we would have to bomb every major civilian center to force their submission.

The only real way to guarantee the military’s surrender would be to blacken the countryside and make sure you killed every living soul.

The repercussions of such an act would be enormous, as the wholesale slaughter of innocent civilians would be an atrocity beyond most people’s comprehension.

Would we be morally justified in killing more people than we were trying to save?

While command of the skies is a great asset, it is only a means to an end. Unless our military is ready to be deployed on the ground to drive the Serbian forces from Kosovo, our command of the air prevents nothing.

Individual units will continue to move unhindered around the countryside and strike with impunity against the native Kosovars.

Putting our soldiers in harm’s way is something we would like to avoid, especially when we know the costs will be significant. But just because we don’t have vital economic or security interests does not mean we should stick our head in the sand and pretend nothing happened.

American forces should be more involved overseas, and they should be actively engaged in protecting those who cannot protect themselves.

We have acted in the defense of our interests whenever it has suited us, and the vast majority of the world resents us for it.

We should actively take a stand for something that doesn’t have a dollar sign attached to it, and if American lives are placed at risk, so be it.

People forget that we have a volunteer army under civilian control, and each person in uniform took an oath with full knowledge that his or her life might be sacrificed. Kosovo is not some abstract theory about containing communism — it is about saving innocent lives.

And if that isn’t more important than the almighty dollar, I demand to know what is.

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Aaron Woell is a junior in political science from Bolingbrook, Ill. He is not a moral sell-out.